> Only in hindsight do we now know that countries opting for shock therapy, such as Poland and Estonia, ended up much better off than those that chose a gradual approach, like Bulgaria and Ukraine:
But Russia also famously opted for shock therapy, and did not manage to transition to a stable, capable and accountable rule-of-law democracy, to put it ridiculously mildly.
Perhaps a better explanation is that countries geographically and culturally closer to western/central Europe tended to be pulled into European norms and to see economic benefits, compared to those closer to the sphere of influence of the Russian kleptocracy.
> [when transitions were gradual], the communist apparatchiks had their own agency. If reforms dragged on, they would have time to regroup, ally with organized crime, and recapture the institutions.
Russia, 30 years after their a sharp transition is ruled by soviet-era secret police officer, allied with organized crime, who has absolutely captured the institutions.
> Anyway, back to the original topic, there are strong reasons to doubt that the lessons from the rapid and harsh reforms in Eastern Europe are applicable to the US, or indeed to any other developed country or organization such as the EU.
Well, I can at least agree it's not a good idea in developed countries. Institutions are hard to build, hard to reform, easy to destroy, and when degraded leave great opportunities for corruption.
> Only in hindsight do we now know that countries opting for shock therapy, such as Poland and Estonia, ended up much better off than those that chose a gradual approach, like Bulgaria and Ukraine:
But Russia also famously opted for shock therapy, and did not manage to transition to a stable, capable and accountable rule-of-law democracy, to put it ridiculously mildly.
Perhaps a better explanation is that countries geographically and culturally closer to western/central Europe tended to be pulled into European norms and to see economic benefits, compared to those closer to the sphere of influence of the Russian kleptocracy.
> [when transitions were gradual], the communist apparatchiks had their own agency. If reforms dragged on, they would have time to regroup, ally with organized crime, and recapture the institutions.
Russia, 30 years after their a sharp transition is ruled by soviet-era secret police officer, allied with organized crime, who has absolutely captured the institutions.
> Anyway, back to the original topic, there are strong reasons to doubt that the lessons from the rapid and harsh reforms in Eastern Europe are applicable to the US, or indeed to any other developed country or organization such as the EU.
Well, I can at least agree it's not a good idea in developed countries. Institutions are hard to build, hard to reform, easy to destroy, and when degraded leave great opportunities for corruption.